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Abstract: Over a million people in the United States are employed in private security and law 
enforcement, yet very little is known about the effects of private police on crime. The current 
study examines the relationship between a privately-funded university police force and crime in 
a large U.S. city. Following an expansion of the jurisdictional boundary of the private police 
force, we see no short-term change in crime. However, using a geographic regression 
discontinuity approach, we find large impacts of private police on public safety, with violent 
crime in particular decreasing. These contradictory results appear to be a consequence of delayed 
effect of private police on crime. 
 
Keywords: Private police; police effectiveness; geographic regression discontinuity 
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1. Introduction 
With constrained public budgets, falling crime rates, and high pay rates of sworn officers, 
there is increasing debate about whether there is an appropriate role for the private sector in 
delivering public safety. As of May 2014, over 1.05 million people in the U.S are employed as 
private police (such as private detectives, investigators, and security guards), up 8% from 2004.1 
That is slightly more than all people employed in computer systems design and related services, 
and more than three times the number of people working in motor vehicle parts production. With 
the rise in private police, however, there have been debates about the lack of their accountability 
to the public, use of excessive force, and violations of constitutional rights (Davis et al. 2010; 
Stenning 2000; Boghosian 2005; Prenzler et al. 1996). Despite significant investments in and 
potential legal implications of private police operating in public spaces, there are only a handful 
of studies that examine the effectiveness of any type of private police on public safety outcomes.  
The few studies in the area find that private police enhance public safety outcomes, with 
campus police in particular decreasing crime across almost every measure (MacDonald, Klick, 
and Grunwald 2012), and private security employed for business improvement districts improved 
public safety outcomes as well (MacDonald et al. 2010, Brooks 2008, Cook and MacDonald 
2011). However, the generalizability of these findings to other communities, the time frame over 
which any gains from private policing are realized, and the comparative impacts of private 
versus conventional police remain poorly understood. 
 This paper seeks to provide new evidence on the impact of private police on crime, 
exploiting a unique setting that permits a credible examination of the causal effect of police both 
in the short and long-run. We focus on the University of Chicago Police Department (UCPD), 
 
1 http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes330000.htm 
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the largest private police department in Chicago (Reaves, 2008) operating in a comparatively 
crime-prone region of a major U.S. city, which is dense (Chicago Tribune 2014) and racially 
diverse (Northwestern Univeristy Center for Healthcare Equity 2011), and subject to the same 
types of crimes as other Chicago neighborhoods (Chicago Tribune 2014). The UCPD is an 
excellent test case for examining the effect of private police on crime because they are highly 
professionalized and accredited department working in a very well-defined and discrete 
geographic space that extends well beyond campus and into the surrounding neighborhoods of 
the South Side of Chicago. 
Using two methods, a difference-in-difference (DD) approach exploiting temporal and 
spatial variation in jurisdictional powers and a geographic regression discontinuity (GRD) design 
exploiting the location of the UCPD jurisdictional border, this study examines the effect that 
UCPD had on crime and violence. Using the DD approach, this study finds the short-term effect 
of the expansion of private police was not statistically significant. The GRD design allows us to 
examine the long-term effect of UCPD by using cumulative crime levels on either side of the 
UCPD jurisdiction border. Using this approach, we find a large and statistically significant 
effect—areas just outside the border of the UCPD patrol area experienced 55% more crime total, 
and 63% greater violent crime. Given the UCPD represent an approximate doubling of police 
presence relative to surrounding neighborhoods with 92 FTE and 3 PTE working within a 6.5 
mile jurisdiction in 2014, these effects translate to an elasticity of overall crime with respect to 
police of about -0.7, and a violent crime elasticity of -0.9, somewhat higher than the elasticities 
estimated for conventional police (Chalfin and McCrary 2013). These differing estimates can be 
reconciled if it takes a substantial period of time—potentially many years--for criminals to 
recognize and respond to the ongoing presence private police.  
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2. Background 
2.1. The Role and Scope of Private Policing 
Private police refer to law enforcement bodies funded and operated by non-governmental 
entities. Many of the spaces commonly viewed as public, such as shopping malls, residential 
areas, parks, and educational campuses, are in fact controlled by private entities (Stenning 2000, 
Wakefield 2008, Joh 2005, Shearing and Stenning 1981, Jones and Newburn 1999). Referred to 
as “mass private property,” these spaces, which are privately-owned but routinely used and 
frequented by the public, now make up a substantial portion of the public space in urban areas 
(Stenning 2000). The owners of these areas may hire their own “police” to ensure both the safety 
of the public who frequent their space, and the protection of their business interests.  
Private police or security typically follow a different license, registration, background 
check, and training than public police officers, and these regulations vary by state. Once licensed 
and approved, private police have the authority to patrol, stop, detain, and search individuals 
without probable cause. Most private security officers and investigators do not have full powers 
of arrest, however, and are typically unarmed (IACP, 2002).  
In many settings, lines have blurred between the private police and public police 
(Wakefield 2008, D’Alessio, Eitle, and Stolzenberg 2005, Joh 2005, Kakalik and Wildhorn 1971, 
University of Chicago Department of Safety and Security 2013, Nalla and Heraux 2003, 
Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1983, Spitzer and Scull 1977, Stenning 2000, Wakefield 2002), and 
many of the remaining distinctions may be more theoretical than practical. Private and public 
officers both seek to reduce crime and increase safety, although the “client base for private police 
[is] smaller” (Nalla and Heraux 2003). Thus the private police may be more concerned with 
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creating a favorable business climate for their employers than with justice. The private police are 
also subject to different oversight and accountability laws than traditional police (Stenning 
2000), which may create unequal services that disproportionately benefit the private sector.  
The size of the private police or security industry has stabilized after years of substantial 
growth. Between 1988 and 1997, the size of private police forces grew by almost 800%, while 
the public police force grew by only 15%,2 and has leveled off since then. There remain 
approximately 300,000 more private than the public police nationwide.3 Some researchers and 
legal scholars believe that the increase in private police, including campus police, may be part of 
the wider trend of privatizing government services (for example Joh 2005, Kempa, Stenning, and 
Wood 2004, Sklansky 1999), in line with the privatization of prisons (Sklansky 1999, Joh 2005), 
and, to a lesser extent, the judicial branch (Savas 1987, Sklansky 1999). Others believe that 
private policing has emerged due to the changing nature of the built environment, such as the 
increasing desire to have outdoor private property open for public access and use.  
2.2. Campus Police: Private or Public Police? 
Rather than traditional public police or private security, this study focuses on a particularly 
prevalent form of private law enforcement—campus police. Of the U.S. universities and four-
year colleges with more than 2,500 students, nearly three quarters employ sworn personnel — 
officers with full arrest powers granted by the government — with some forces consisting of 
more than 300 officers (Reaves 2008). While some may have full police powers, they are funded 
by the colleges and universities that they protect, which distinguishes them from public police. In 
addition to granting campus law enforcement agencies greater policing power, there has been a 
 
2 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Protective Service Occupations. 
3 According to the BLS, as of May 2013, there were 740,340 public patrol officers or detectives, and 1,066,730 private security guards in the 
United States (2013).  
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concurrent increase in the size of the jurisdictions under their control, extending beyond their 
respective campuses (Peak, Barthe, and Garcia 2008). This may be part of the larger movement 
towards privately-funding police and security officers to protect individuals and property. 
Although campus police fall under the umbrella of private police, they may have more in 
common with the public police than traditional private security. Campus police departments, as 
they are increasingly known, are often fully accredited law enforcement agencies employing 
sworn police officers. Nearly 90% of departments employ armed patrol officers (Reaves, 2008). 
Campus law enforcement agencies also engage in a variety of formal police duties, including 
uniformed patrols, arrests, and investigations (Peak, Barthe, and Garcia 2008). The activities 
performed by campus law enforcement agencies includes investigations, crime prevention, 
parking enforcement, training, crime reporting under the Clery Act (Janosik and Gregory 2003), 
public event coordination, planning, narcotics, traffic and accident investigations, dealing with 
hazardous materials, canine, and SWAT (Reaves 2008, Peak, Barthe, and Garcia 2008).  
While the responsibilities and activities of campus police and public police are quite 
similar, they also differ in other respects that may be relevant for analysis in this study. Campus 
police agencies are more likely than local departments to conduct community-relations skills 
assessments of new recruits, whereas local departments are more likely to require written 
aptitude testing and physical screening. In addition, while more campus officers are college-
educated, public police officers have more police academy and in-service training requirements 
(Reaves 2008).  
2.3. Measuring the Effect of Police on Crime 
Standard economic models of crime (Becker 1993; Ehrlich, 1981; Ehrlich, 2010) posit 
that rational individuals trade off the gains from crime with the costs of punishment and commit 
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crime when the expected benefit outweighs the expected costs. Potential victims invest in 
protective measures designed to increase the cost of committing an offense and thus reduce 
incentives to commit crime (Cook 1986). Such measures can include individual efforts such as 
installation of locks and alarms or avoiding higher crime areas, but also investments in collective 
law enforcement activities, both public and private.  
Optimal choices regarding the level of private policing activity can take into account that 
private police may have a wider scope of objectives than traditional police. Some research 
suggests that private police are concerned with preventing or reducing losses and, accordingly, 
are more concerned with monitoring, surveillance, and prevention than with arrest and 
punishment (Joh 2004). The private police in this study exist in a comparatively high crime area 
of the city and there is significant concern about conventional crime such as robbery or burglary. 
Therefore, we anticipate that one of its primary objectives is traditional street crime reduction, 
and in this respect, UCPD may be atypical in comparison to other private police forces that are 
more focused on loss prevention. 
In the context of Chicago and the UCPD, some blocks are patrolled by both public and 
private police. This additional supply of policing services relative to areas patrolled by only the 
CPD is hypothesized to increase the expected cost of offending by raising probability of getting 
caught, and thus reduce the supply of crime. For blocks that become newly covered by the 
UCPD, whether we observe shifts in crime depends not only on the effectiveness of private 
police, but also on the speed with which behavioral change occurs. For example, when UCPD 
officers first occupy a new expansion area, they may require time to build relationships with 
people in the community or confidential informants and learn about the contours of the built 
environment. Moreover, traditional police may respond to the presence of private police by 
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reallocating effort towards other areas.  In that case, private police substitute for public police, 
therefore attenuating any positive effect private police have on reducing crime.  
 Ultimately, whether private police affect crime is an empirical question. The basic 
problem of measuring the effect of police on crime is not a new one, although our focus on 
private rather than traditional law enforcement is novel. A persistent empirical challenge 
identified by past researchers (Marvell and Moody 1996) is to cleanly separate the impacts of 
police from the myriad other factors that affect crime rates. Beyond this typical difficulty due 
simultaneity and omitted variable bias, and additional obstacle that arises in this context is that of 
reverse causality—the size of the police force may not only affect crime, but also respond to 
changes in the crime rate through the political process.4 
To resolve some of these methodological challenges to estimating the effect of police 
forces on crime, researchers have turned to a number of quasi-experimental research designs. 
Levitt (1997, 2002) and McCrary (2002) exploit the fact that police hiring often occurs around 
mayoral and gubernatorial elections, and the timing of these elections across jurisdictions is not 
determined by crime rates. Corman and Mocan (1996) and Buonanno and Mastrobuoni (2012) 
make use of the fact that hiring decisions are often made long before new officers can be 
deployed due to training lags, meaning that the timing of when officers start may be not be 
correlated to current crime rates. Di Tella and Schargrodsky ( 2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005), 
and Draca, Machin, and Witt ( 2011) focus on personnel reallocations that occur in repsonse to 
terrorist threats, the timing of which is unrelated to patterns of underlying street crime. Evans 
and Owens (2007) use a large federal hiring program that created new officer positions in 
 
4 Chalfin and McCrary (Chalfin and McCrary 2013) identify an additional source of bias in estimates that exploit cross-jurisdiction variation in 
police force size and crime—measurement error. They demonstrate that common sources of information about police staffing levels show 
inconsistencies which lead to downward biased estimates of the effects of police on crime. Because we consider data from a single 
jurisdiction, our analysis is not subject to the measurement error problem they highlight. 
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numerous jursidictions across the U.S., with slots determined in a manner unrelated to pre-
existing crime. These studies focus on different lags in the impact of police on crime, yet each 
found that an increase in police presence or force size led to a decrease in crime.  
Based on the existing literature, we might expect a substantial decline in street crime in 
areas with substantial private police presence. However, we would only expect such an effect 
magnitude if private police are as effective at reducing crime as traditional police, a proposition 
that has not been well tested to date, and one that is evaluated empirically in this study. Perhaps 
closest to the present study is MacDonald, Klick, and Grunwald (2012), which uses a geographic 
discontinuity design to test the effects of extra police provided by a private university, finding 
significant impacts. However, that study is only cross sectional and does not have the advantage 
of being able to observe what happens to crime before and after the patrol boundary of the 
private police was altered. As a result it could only estimate the long-term effect of the private 
police on neighborhood crime. By contrast, we are able to capitalize on the natural experiment 
that occurred with the expanded geographic coverage of a private university police force to 
estimate the short-term effect of adding extra private police to a set of neighborhood blocks, and 
a geographic regression discontinuity to test the effect of extra police on crime over a long-term.  
3. University of Chicago Police Department 
The UCPD was formally established in the 1960s, and granted full police powers through 
an Illinois Law, the Private College Campus Police Act (110 ILCS 1020). The police department 
is CALEA®-accredited, and operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.5 Officers are required to 
complete a series of background checks and training including, background investigation, written 
and medical exams, oral interview, psychological test, drug screen and physical fitness test 
 
5  http://safety-security.uchicago.edu/police/. 
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(POWER Test), training consistent with Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board 
(ILETSB), weeks of Chicago Police Academy training, and finally the UCPD Field Training 
Program. The department has separate, additional emergency and investigation phone lines from 
the Chicago Police Department (CPD); although individuals can always call 9-1-1 for services 
from CPD.  
The size of the UCPD police force grew over most of the period analyzed in this study. 
Specifically, the number of full time-equivalent (FTE) officers grew on average 7 percent 
annually between 2000 and 2010, from 83 to 145 FTEs, and fell again to 80 FTEs in 2012.6 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) police employee data indicates there was one police officer for 
every 212 people in the city of Chicago. As of 2010, the UCPD had one officer for every 464 
people within its jurisdiction. Therefore, by 2010, the number of officers per capita was 50% 
greater within the UCPD zone than outside the UCPD zone.  
The UCPD’s patrol area is not limited to the campus itself, but instead extends beyond 
the campus border into the surrounding community, which includes student housing, commercial 
areas, and residential neighborhoods. The area monitored by UCPD has expanded over time and 
is currently approximately 6.5 square miles, containing over 65,000 residents; although formal 
documentation and details of its size and expansion are spotty (Larson 2012). Importantly for the 
purpose of this study, the off-campus areas patrolled by the UCPD are similar in many ways to 
the surrounding neighborhoods patrolled exclusively by the CPD. In particular, there are few 
qualitative differences in the quality of the housing stock, types of housing (primarily condos, 
 
6  Unpublished data provided by the University of Chicago Police Department. 
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townhomes, and apartments), school assignments, or other neighborhood characteristics at the 
boundary of the UCPD patrol area, a reality we demonstrate more formally later.7 
 Over the past decade the UCPD has expanded its primary jurisdiction from 39th to 64th 
Streets and Cottage Grove Avenue to Lake Shore Drive. As shown in Figure 1, the first 
expansion of UCPD authority occurred in October 2001 and included 78 Census blocks (shown 
in blue) south of the original UCPD area. And in April 2004, UCPD expanded its jurisdictional 
boundary by 105 additional Census square blocks north of the original UCPD area. There was a 
third expansion in May 2012, which was not included in these analyses because there is not a 
long enough follow-up period (highlighted in orange). These expansions were in response to 
student, faculty, and other security officers concern that the crime in the surrounding area was 
directly impacting school safety and the viability of the institution (Larson, 2012). 
Since crime data is not available before the beginning of the UCPD in the 1960s, this 
study only analyzes the impact of the two expansions that occurred in 2001 and 2004. Consistent 
crime definitions and data collection methods started in 2001, so there are only 9 months of 
reliable pre-period crime data before the first expansion occurred in October 2001. We also 
investigate whether there are any effects on crime over time in these expansion zones.  
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Short-run Effect: Natural Experiment 
The first identification strategy of this study exploits the change in UCPD boundaries 
over time. In October 2001, 52 populated Census blocks went from being CPD-only to 
additionally being under UCPD jurisdiction (Expansion I), and in April 2004, an additional 77 
populated Census blocks became UCPD jurisdiction (Expansion II). These two areas are 
 
7 Perhaps the main exceptions are portions of the western and southeastern boundary of the UCPD patrol area which are contiguous to large 
parks. 
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considered the “treatment” blocks. We define the control area as the 1,954 populated Census 
blocks surrounding UCPD jurisdictions where UCPD never had jurisdiction, including parts of 
the Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Greater Grand Crossing, Hyde Park, Kenwood, Oakland, South 
Shore, Washington Park and Woodlawn neighborhoods. We conduct a differences-in-differences 
(DD) estimation in which the change in average monthly crime rates before-and-after the 
introduction of UCPD in the treatment blocks is compared to the change in monthly crime in the 
control blocks. Models include block and month-year fixed effects, and specifications adjust 
standard errors for clustering at the block-level. Monthly block-level crime counts are the 
outcome, and the model is estimated using Poisson regression to account for the count nature of 
the data.89 
A key assumption of the DD methodology is that the outcome in the treatment and 
control group is assumed to follow the same time trend in the absence of the treatment (parallel 
trends assumption). In order to analyze pre-trends, this study also includes a DD model with 
leads and lags (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006). Specifically, pertaining to time relative to the first 
month of UCPD entering a jurisdiction, we include a series of dummies coding the month-year of 
jurisdiction expansion and each month pre- and post-jurisdiction expansion.  
4.2. Long-Run Effect: Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design 
The second identification strategy focuses on the longer-term effect of UCPD and 
exploits the geographic discontinuity caused by having extra private police on one side of the 
patrol zone and not the other. If the UCPD impacts crime, we would expect to see different crime 
 
8 Since Census blocks are relatively small (approximately 60 people per block), there are many zeroes in the data, which might affect the 
precision of the estimates. We also estimate the DD regressions using as Census block groups (with approximately 1,000 people per block 
group). Unlike with the smaller blocks, however, there are block groups that overlap jurisdictional boundaries. Results are available from 
the authors and are similar. 
9 As noted by a number of authors, including Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd (2012), the interpretation of DD coefficients is somewhat more 
complicated in a Poisson count model due to its nonlinearity. Puhani (2012) points out, however, that coefficients on the DD interaction 
term can be used to examine the sign and significance of the treatment effect in a nonlinear model under fairly general conditions. 
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patterns in their patrol zone relative to areas outside of their patrol zone. However, simple 
comparisons of crime between the blocks patrolled by UCPD to those not controlled by UCPD 
may not reveal the true causal effect of police because of potentially unobserved differences in 
neighborhood characteristics between the two areas of the city. To mitigate bias that might arise 
due to omitted neighborhood characteristics, we adopt a regression discontinuity design that 
focuses on changes in crime immediately surrounding the UCPD patrol border, which in most 
cases, is miles away from the main campus.  
The UCPD boundaries seem well-suited to this analytic strategy because they are 
precisely defined, known to the police and public, and not contiguous with any campus border, 
but are largely unrelated to neighborhood or other geographic boundaries that would potentially 
affect crime patterns. By focusing attention of border areas, we ensure that the “treated” areas 
with additional private police are as comparable as possible to the comparison areas with only 
traditional police. For example, the volume of unattended cars parked on the street is likely to 
affect the number of vehicle thefts that occur on a particular block, and this characteristic is 
unobserved and thus cannot be directly controlled in our analysis. While there may be significant 
differences on average in vehicular parking patterns around the UCPD campus versus the 
comparison neighborhoods, it seems less plausible that parking patterns would vary significantly 
between two blocks that are situated next to one another in the same neighborhood, but which lie 
of differing sides of the UCPD border. Thus, a comparison between two border blocks might 
potentially offer a better opportunity to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of the campus 
police. The GRD approach offers an opportunity to estimate such differences across a large 
number of blocks within a well-established statistical framework. 
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In our context the running variable for the GRD design is distance to the border. We note, 
however, that unlike in the traditional RD design, in our case treatment (private police 
protection) and control status are not assigned by a scoring mechanism with a known functional 
form. Moreover, for the RD approach to recover the true causal effect of private police, we 
require that there be no geographic spillovers resulting from the existence of the boundary. If, for 
example, criminals concentrate just outside of the UCPD patrol boundary in an effort to avoid 
detection, the border area may provide a poor counterfactual for the amount of crime that would 
be expected in the UCPD area absent the UCPD, and we might overstate the impacts of private 
police. 
We estimate the change in the crime at the discontinuity using regression methods 
typically applied to regression discontinuity modeling; in particular, we consider crime counts as 
an outcome and model these as a function of an indicator as to whether a block lies outside the 
UCPD boarder and additional controls, with the controls including functions capturing the 
distance to the border. We consider a range of alternative parameterizations of the model, 
including varying the degree of the polynomial in distance and applying local linear regression. 
We also conduct falsification tests using the same variables and modeling strategy with 
geocoded data on business licenses and vehicle traffic as outcomes, which should not be 
associated with the UCPD boundaries.   
5. Data 
Street-level crime incident data were taken from the publicly-available CPD Citizen Law 
Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) website (www.gis.chicagopolice.org), which 
includes crime incidents from 2001 onwards reported to the police and geocoded to the closest 
block. Individual events are classified into crime categories by CPD. This study analyzes four 
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major categories, following the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting 
Program — a sum of total reported crime; and the disaggregates of violent crime (including the 
Part I crimes of homicide, criminal sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault), property 
crime (including the Part 1 crimes of burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson), and 
public violence (Part I violent crimes and firearms-related crimes occurring outside of a business 
or residence, excluding domestic violence). The overall reported crime measure includes Part II 
less serious crimes. We also examined Part II crimes separately but decided against presenting 
the findings here since they are much more susceptible bias in reporting and recording (Gove, 
Hughes, and Geerken 1985).  
Street-level incident data were aggregated to the Census block level, and none of the 
blocks are split across both sides of the UCPD boundary. The comparison blocks are drawn from 
the community areas surrounding the UCPD jurisdiction most similar in character to Hyde Park, 
including Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Greater Grand Crossing, Kenwood, Oakland, South Shore, 
Washington Park and Woodlawn; blocks in Hyde Park that are not in the UCPD jurisdiction are 
also included in the comparison area. Data on block-level demographics, socio-economic 
characteristics, and population were taken from the 2000 and 2010 US Censuses, and linearly 
interpolated to generate annual estimates.  
5.1. Short-Run Effect: Natural Experiment 
For the DD analysis, a block/month panel is built from January 2001 to December 2010, 
and the evolution of crime in the expansion areas is analyzed compared to control areas over 
time. The total analytical sample includes 2,082 populated Census blocks with at least one crime 
over the period analyzed; 1,953 blocks fall within the control group (blocks never patrolled by 
UCPD because they are outside the expansions zones) and 129 are in the treatment group (UCPD 
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expansion I is 52 blocks and expansion II area is 77 blocks). On average, approximately 1.7 
crimes are committed in the CPD Census blocks per month and 1.4 crimes are committed in the 
UCPD blocks. The age and gender distributions are similar between the two groups, but the 
population and ethnic distribution differ. Population per block is greater in the UCPD area and 
there is a greater proportion of blacks in the CPD area.   
Figure 2 illustrates crime trends for total crime in each of the two areas analyzed over the 
period investigated from January 2001 to December 2010. The thin vertical line indicates the 
timing of Expansion I (October 2001), and the thick vertical line indicates Expansion II (April 
2004). Both jurisdictions have similar seasonal patterns of crime, and the difference between the 
two jurisdictions narrowed over the period investigated. Importantly for the DD design, the 
crime pre-trends appear to be similar between the two groups. 
5.2. Long-Run Effect: Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design 
For the GRD analysis, the data is pooled into a single cross-section of blocks by summing 
the number of crimes committed within each block over the period April 2004 and May 2012. 
This means the GRD analysis is based on only the period after the phased in expansion so that 
there are no jurisdictional changes during our observation period.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics describing the demographic characteristics of the 
UCPD blocks based upon 2010 Census data. We also report RD estimates of the change in each 
demographic characteristic at the boundary, along with each estimate’s associated standard error 
and p-value. There are few differences in the race or other demographics of the resident 
population, their income, or housing characteristics comparing the UCPD blocks to nearby 
blocks outside of the patrol zone. Where differences exist, in practical terms the disparities are 
small. Because of the large number of tested characteristics, even absent any true discontinuities, 
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some statistically significant coefficients may arise due to chance alone when using conventional 
significance levels. If the UCPD areas do not differ systematically from the control areas at the 
discontinuity, then the p-values of the differences in characteristics should be uniformly 
distributed, and an omnibus Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for balance across the full set of 
characteristics listed in the table fails to reject the null hypothesis of balance (p=.99). This 
suggests the CPD blocks near the boundary are similar to UCPD blocks near the boundary.  
6. Results 
6.1.  Short-Run Effect: Natural Experiment  
 Results of our DD regressions analyzing the effect of the UCPD on total crime and then 
separately by crime type are presented in Table 2. The first column indicates that there was no 
statistically significant effect on monthly crime identified in the areas annexed by the UCPD. 
When estimating the effect on violent, property and other crimes separately, the difference in the 
logs of expected counts is found to be similar between the CPD-only blocks and UCPD blocks, 
holding all else constant in the model. Lastly, focusing on any violent crime occurring out in 
public, results indicate the effect of UCPD is statistically insignificant. When analyzing the 
effect of each expansion area separately, results are consistent with the main findings, and no 
statistically significant impacts are apparent.  
We next replicate the previous DD analyses but this time consider lead and lag effects of 
expanding jurisdiction. Including leads allows us to observe potential confounding effects of pre-
existing trends and test for possible endogeneity in jurisdiction expansion, and examining lags 
offers an opportunity to more finely assess the dynamics of post-expansion crime. One month 
pre-expansion is the excluded dummy for each expansion area and is set equal to zero in our 
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presentation of results (Figure 3). We present point estimates as the dashed line and the 95 
percent confidence interval in the solid lines. 
These trends support the findings reported in Table 2 of no statistically significant impact 
additional private police on crime in the short- to medium-run. Crime begins to trend downward 
in the treated areas approximately 80 months from jurisdiction expansion, although these shifts 
are not statistically significant.10 To the extent that private police impact crime, such impacts 
may only be discernable over the longer-term. For this analysis we turn to the GRD results. 
6.2. Long-Run Effect: Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design 
Given the similarities in demographics and other characteristics of the blocks 
immediately beyond the UCPD border to those areas within the border (Table 1), absent any 
long-run impact of private police on crime, we might expect crime rates to be similar across the 
two areas as well. Figure 4 shows the relationship between average block distance to the 
boundary and the total number of violent crimes over the period of investigation, along with the 
polynomials of best fit. As the figure shows, there is a higher density of crimes just beyond the 
UCPD border. There is no simple explanation for the drop in crime observed at the boundary 
other than the fact that areas within the boundary are patrolled by extra private police.   
Results of our GRD regressions analyzing the effect of a block residing on the UCPD 
side of a border on four categories of crime are presented in Table 3. For our baseline model we 
include no demographic controls but account for distance to the border using local linear 
regression, which has some desirable statistical properties relative to other methods of 
 
10 We test a number of other time variables in order to identify the speed with which crime declined as a result of       the two expansions. We use 
quarterly- and annual-level data, and test time dummies, time trends, and nonlinear time effects. Results are statistically insignificant 
overall, as well as for expansion I and expansion II separately. 
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accounting for distance.11 The treatment variable indicates being outside of the UCPD patrol 
area, so a positive estimate indicates a reduction in crime from the UCPD. Results are 
statistically significant and indicate that CPD blocks had 68.7 more crimes than UCPD blocks in 
total over eight years, from April 2004 through May 2012, which corresponds to 55% more 
crime (mean number of crimes per year in the UCPD and CPD patrol zones were 126 and 162, 
respectively). There was also a statistically significant impact on violent crime at the 1% level, 
such that there were 9.7 more violent crimes per block on the CPD side, which represents 63% 
fewer violent crimes (mean number of violent crimes in UCPD and CPD patrol zones was 11 and 
17, respectively). Overall, it does not appear that the UCPD had a statistically significant impact 
on property crime or violent crime committed only in the public space, although the point 
estimates suggest potentially large impacts on these crimes in a practical sense. On an annual 
basis, blocks within the UCPD patrol boundaries had an average of 8.5 fewer crimes per year, of 
which 1.2 were violent crimes. 
Table 4 demonstrates that these findings are robust to a number of logical specification 
changes to the RD design. Specification 1 estimates the same model using logged crime and 
finds similar results. Controlling for a multitude of socio-economic characteristics (column 2), 
results become only marginally significant for total crime, yet remain statistically significant for 
violent crimes at the 1% level; there were approximately 9 more violent crimes per block in the 
CPD area. The robust model, which generates confidence intervals robust to differing bandwidth 
choices for the local polynomial regression according to the procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo and 
Titiunik (2014), indicates an even greater effect of UCPD than found in the base model. The 
 
11 Gelman and Imbens (2014) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) provide a more detailed discussion of the advantages of local linear regression in 
this context. 
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impact of UCPD was 83.2 fewer crimes per block overall, and a statistically significant fewer 
11.3 violent crimes per block on the UCPD side of the border. 
Specifications 4 and 5 use conventional polynomials rather than local linear regression to 
account for distance and yield similar results. In Specification 6, we estimates a “donut”-RD 
design by omitting blocks less than 50 meters from the border, while in Specification 7, we only 
include blocks within 400 meters of the border in the analysis, ensuring identification comes 
solely through areas near to the border. In both cases the estimated impacts for overall and 
violent crime remain qualitatively similar, although the smaller number of observations in these 
specifications renders the estimates appreciably less precise. Finally, in Specification 8 we 
measure distance based upon block centroids versus block edges, and again observe large 
impacts on overall and violent crime. Across the various specifications we see consistent 
evidence that private police reduce violent crime, and some evidence of an impact of overall 
crime. 
To put these magnitudes in perspective, we can roughly equate the impacts above to 
elasticities of police with respect the crime, the conventional metric reported in studies of the 
effects of police. Although precise manpower data for the UCPD over the entire period are 
elusive, in 2014 the UCPD had around 92 FTE and 3 PTE working within its 6.5 mile 
jurisdiction in 2014, which represents an approximate doubling of police presence relative to 
neighboring areas of the city, assuming no crowding out. Then, these effects translate to an 
elasticity of overall crime with respect to police of about -0.7, and a violent crime elasticity of -
0.9, somewhat higher than the elasticities estimated for conventional police. 
If the GRD design is an appropriate method for modeling the effects of CPD presence, 
we might see changes in crime across the border, but we shouldn’t expect to detect changes in 
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other outcomes not logically connected with police presence. To examine this, we geocoded data 
on business licenses and traffic volume obtained from the City of Chicago Data Portal and 
applied a similar GRD analysis to these outcomes as a falsification test. Those falsification tests 
did not identify any measurable discontinuity along the UCPD boundary in either business 
licenses or traffic volume.12  The lack of an effect when examining these other outcomes 
supports the use of the GRD methodology as a way of measuring the influence of the CPD.   
6.  Discussion  
Our analysis indicates that the introduction of private police in a new patrol area initially 
had no measurable effect of crime, yet, after sufficient time has passed, the presence of private 
police is associated with economically meaningful reductions in crime. How do we reconcile 
these findings with those of papers such as Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Klick and 
Tabarrok (2005), and Draca, Machin, and Witt (2011), all of which demonstrate using credible 
quasi-experiments that invovled similarly large shifts in police presence that criminal activity can 
repsond rapidly to changes in police presence? 
One possiblity is that culture is key, and there are cultural or other environmental 
differences between Chicago and the other locations studied that cause the effects of police in 
this study to be different from those observed other places. However, given that the existing 
studies span multiple countries and time periods and yet get fairly consistent impacts, it seems 
less likely that cultural differences alone can explain the difference in results. 
An alterantive explanation for the disparity pertains to the fact that private police are 
separately governed from the public police and the two organizations may have distinct goals. 
Prior studies that demonstrate substantial short-run effects of changes in police presence focus on 
 
12 The full set of results is available upon request. 
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contexts where there is central management of enforcement levels across the entire jursidiction. 
In this study, both the CPD and the UCPD provide enforcement services simultaneously and 
without direct coordination. The CPD could respond strategically to an expansion of the UCPD 
in a variety of ways—by cutting back its presence in the newly patrolled areas, leading to a 
partial displacement of the new private police, by expanding presence in the areas immediately 
surrounding the expansion zone, in an effort to contain spillover effects, or both. Our short-run 
results would be expected if the public police alter their patrol patterns in a way that negates the 
effects of the boundary expansion.  
However, given that we ultimately observe differences in crime based on the UCPD 
boundaries, any explanation that relies on the compensatory behavior by the CPD requires that 
such behavior be only temporary, and there is no obvious explanation for why such differences 
could persist for several years but not indefintely. Moreover, a number of factors would have 
made it difficult for CPD to appreciably reduce its patrol effort in repsonse to the expansions. 
There was strong community pressure to increase police presence when both expansions 
occurred, and so a rollback by the CPD would likely have met with community resistance. Also, 
the patrol structure of the CPD, which is organized around geogrpahic beats that have reamined 
fairly constant over time, would complicate efforts to diminsh patrol in a narrowly defined area 
without endangering neighboring blocks not patrolled by the UCPD. Finally, there is little 
evidence from media accounts or our discussions with individuals in the UCPD or CPD that 
suggest that the CPD engages in such strategic behaivor. Thus, while acknowleding the 
possiblity that the patterns we observe might reflect displacement, we do not find this to be a 
likely explanation for our findings. More generally, however, the issue of crowding out is an 
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important one that is specifically relevant when considering the impacts of private rather than 
public police. 
A related possiblity is that private police crowd out private precautionary measures. If the 
expansions reduced investment in alarm systems and led to citizens in the affected areas to be 
more willing to engage in risky behaviors such as walking alone at night, or otherwise diminshed 
private precaution, then net impact might be small even if police themselves do have some 
salutary effect. Lacking data on private precaution, we are unable to test this hypothesis directly. 
However, the timing and magnitude of the effects we observe would seem to disfigure private 
crowding out as an explanation—under this explanation, individuals in the expansion areas 
would need to reduce private precautionary measures fairly quickly to fully offset the effects of 
private patrols, but then over time increase private precautionary behavior so as to render the 
effects of police eventually detectible. The costs of the private police were borne by the 
university rather than neighborhood residents, so the expansions had no direct influence on the 
budget constraints affecting potential victims. Moreover, it seems unlikely that private 
precaution could be sufficiently protective so as to account for changes in crime of 50% or more. 
One important difference between our Chicago context and the policing variation studied 
in past research is that introduction of private police in Chicago were expected to be relatively 
permanent, whereas in the other studies, policing changes were likely to be transient. One 
possiblity is that criminals might be willing to displace their activity temporarily at fairly low 
cost, but may have difficulty making permanent career changes. For example, individuals who 
rely on drug selling or acquisitive crimes for income may be able to defer criminal activity 
during periods of high police scrutiny so long as such periods are sufficiently brief; at some 
point, however, the need for income will override the risk of capture. Under this job-centric view 
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of criminal activity, criminals respond to events such as those in documented in London by 
Draca, Machin, and Witt ( 2011) by taking a “vacation” from crime, leading to short-run drops in 
crime, but crime reasserts itself once the period of hightened enforcement has passed. In 
Chicago, in contrast, when expansions occur, criminals may recognize the permanence of the 
new arrangement and thus not respond by taking “vacations”, leading to little short-run effect on 
crime patterns. A permanent increase in enforcement reduces the returns to being a criminal in 
the targeted area, however, so over time criminals sustitute to other careers or other locations, 
leading to the larger long-run effects we demonstrate. If this model explains our findings, one 
implication is that the speed of “job” adjustment is fairly slow, as we do not find signficant 
changes in crime when boundaries are changed even several years post-expansion. The model, if 
also correct, would imply that private police forces may require sustained investment over a long 
period time to be fully effective. 
Our analysis also connects with the extensive popular discussion and academic debate 
surrounding the problem of crime and violence at institutions of higher education. Over the past 
few decades, the nature of the discourse has changed, as campus crime has evolved into a major 
social issue, requiring federal and state political action (Sloan and Fisher 2010). Colleges and 
universities face pressure from governments, students, and activist organizations to ensure 
campus safety. Campus law enforcement agencies are a central component of crime reduction 
efforts, yet the effect of campus law enforcement agencies on campus crime and violence has 
received scant attention in the empirical literature.  
We note that in this study, as in all studies of the effect of enforcement effort that rely on 
geographic comparisons, it is impossible to know with certainty whether the additional police 
reduced crime in an absolute sense or merely displaced it to other areas. Displacement is of 
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particular concern for public police because displacement results in a reallocation of workload 
across different geographic units with no net benefit for the department as a whole. For private 
police, the calculus is more complicated—because private police exist to further the interests of a 
particular constituency, to the extent that private police increase safety for their constituents, 
even at the cost of displacing crime to others, they may view themselves as successfully fulfilling 
their mission. Additionally, if willingness to invest in private police is driven by differences in 
the costs of victimization, then private police may promote a form of allocative efficiency even if 
they primarily displace rather than prevent crime. 
7. Conclusions 
 This study demonstrates that investment in private security can have a meaningful impact 
on serious crime in surrounding areas over a long-run. Using two approaches to examine the 
impact of a privately-funded police force on neighborhood safety – a natural experiment in 
which the authority of the University of Chicago Police Department expanded jurisdictional 
boundaries in 2001 and 2004 to capture the short-term effect of their expansion on crime, and a 
geographic regression discontinuity approach to capture the longer-term effect, we show that 
private police do not have a measurable effect in the short- to medium-run, but in the long run, 
additional policing reduced violent crime by over 50% in the target areas.  
We offer several potential explanations for these contradictory findings across our two 
research designs. First, there could be a substitution effect with the private police simply 
replacing the public police services in the new area in the short run. Second, there could be a 
substitution effect with other forms of self-protection (such as alarms, private guards, or selective 
avoidance/seeking of crime-prone/improbable areas), such that households and businesses 
reduced spending in security when UCPD expanded. Third, and perhaps most likely, there may 
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be a long delay of the effect of the extra police on crime because it takes a long time to change 
the crime dynamics of neighborhoods, as criminals adjust to permanent increases in the cost of 
committing crime. 
The University of Chicago’s experience shows that campus law enforcement may be a 
cost-effective means of addressing crime and violence in higher education settings, at least with 
a sustained investment over many years. The implications of these findings may be particularly 
important as Congress turns their eyes once again towards campus safety and crime prevention. 
In the UCPD’s jurisdiction, only thirty-four percent of violent crimes occurred on campus. The 
University of Chicago is not an outlier in this respect, as nationwide, more crimes involving 
college students occur off-campus than on. Expanding the jurisdiction of campus police 
departments, and allowing officers to patrol beyond their borders, may be integral to their 
success. More broadly, our research suggests that private police can be as effective at crime 
control as traditional police, at least in some circumstances. Additional efforts to rigorously 
measure the impacts of private police are warranted so as to allow us to better identify the 
contexts in which private police matter most for public safety. 
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Tables 
  
Table(s)
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for UCPD patrol zone 
 Average for 
block groups 
within UCPD 
patrol zone SD 
Estimated 
change 
at the 
border 
SE 
of 
estimate 
P-
value 
Total Population 1185.19 493.46 -167.98 80.17 0.04* 
Fraction Black 0.76 0.29 -0.01 0.05 0.84 
Fraction Hispanic 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.43 
Fraction young 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.55 
Fraction recently moved 0.19 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.42 
Fraction living alone 0.44 0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.40 
Fraction of children not living with 
parents 
0.14 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.08 
Fraction married 0.28 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.84 
Fraction HS dropout 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.84 
Median household income 37,990 20,736 3034 3645 0.41 
Fraction with no earnings 0.27 0.15 -0.03 0.03 0.26 
Fraction receiving SSI 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.76 
Fraction receiving public 
assistance 
0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.11 
Fraction veterans 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.86 
Fraction unemployed 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.81 
Fraction not in labor force 0.39 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.61 
Number of housing units 647.77 293.93 -61.63 55.95 0.27 
Rental share of housing stock 0.69 0.18 -0.03 0.04 0.54 
Fraction of houses vacant 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.17 
Median # rooms 4.61 0.87 0.22 0.18 0.23 
Share of houses that are single unit 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.83 
Median contract rent 751.39 238.94 127.80 38.73 0.00** 
Median house value 255,037 108,085 24,583 20,942 0.24 
Fraction low income 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.58 
% below poverty line 0.29 0.12 -0.07 0.03 0.01** 
% non-citizen 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.51 
% disabled 0.15 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.51 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The unit of observation is a block group and the sample size is 1,065. 
 
 
Table 2. Difference-in-Difference Results of UCPD Effect on Block-level Monthly Crime 
Dependent variable:  
Block-level crimes per month 
Total 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
Other 
Crime 
Public 
Violence 
Overall Effect -0.013 -0.015 -0.094 0.020 -0.044 
(0.076) (0.064) (0.154) (0.062) (0.116) 
Number of Observations 249,840 245,520 249,360 249,600 249,720 
Number of Blocks 2,082 2,046 2,078 2,080 2,081 
Expansion I Effect only 0.020 -0.031 -0.136 0.109 -0.059 
 (0.064) (0.137) (0.070) (0.889) (0.087) 
Number of Observations 240,600 236,760 240,360 240,360 240,480 
Number of Blocks 2,005 1,973 2,003 2,003 2,004 
Expansion II Effect only -0.021 -0.004 -0.082 -0.0002 -0.039 
 (0.091) (0.072) (0.187) (0.072) (0.143) 
Number of Observations 243,600 239,520 243,120 243,360 243,480 
Number of Blocks 2,030 1,996 2,026 2,028 2,029 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Reported coefficients are from Poisson model. Block clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. All models include block fixed effects, month-year fixed effects, and average block 
demographic characteristics as controls, which include: age distribution, ethnicity, race, gender, and 
population. Number of blocks may vary because blocks with zero crime in all periods drop from analyses. 
 
Table 3. Geographic Regression Discontinuity Results 
 (1) 
All Crime 68.70* 
 (35.69) 
Observations 1065 
Violent Crime 9.72** 
 (3.52) 
Observations 1065 
Property Crime 11.58 
 (10.83) 
Observations 1065 
Public Violence 47.21 
 (25.00) 
Observations 1065 
 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05. Table notes: (1) base model (local linear regression) 
 
  
Table 4. Robustness Check for Geographic Regression Discontinuity Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All Crime 0.55* 58.69 83.20* 65.07 86.94 44.42 57.67 80.55** 
 (0.29) (34.80) (41.97) (34.52) (48.52) (58.62) (52.44) (18.14) 
Observations 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 451 251 1065 
Violent Crime 0.63** 8.66** 11.30** 8.27** 11.60* 7.01 9.64 6.87** 
 (0.24) (3.46) (4.22) (3.24) (4.82) (4.82) (5.05) (1.63) 
Observations 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 451 251 1065 
Property 
Crime 
0.36 10.32 15.96 7.29 18.22 5.35 8.84 17.50** 
 (0.26) (10.53) (12.56) (9.63) (12.90) (19.26) (14.08) (5.40) 
Observations 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 451 251 1065 
Public 
Violence 
0.49 27.02 43.66 49.51 37.79 -1.67 51.10 71.38** 
 (0.27) (23.85) (30.00) (24.84) (36.20) (49.18) (32.73) (12.04) 
Observations 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 451 251 1065 
Table notes: (1) logged outcomes, (2) include covariates, (3) robust model. (4) quadratic polynomial in distance, (5) 
cubic polynomial in distance (6) omit border (7) near border only (8) alternative distance metric.  
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Figure 1. UCPD Extended Patrol Map 
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Figure 2. Mean Total Crimes per Block per Month in UCPD and CPD Areas Analyzed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Results from Event Study Analysis of Jurisdiction Expansion, (2001-2010) 
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Figure 4. Violent crime by block distance from patrol boundary 
 
